

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

PERSONNEL RECOVERY UPDATE

Oct-Dec 2001

Issue 10

PERSONNEL CHANGES ABOUND AT DPMO

Since our last newsletter there have been numerous personnel changes in our staff. The most important change is the arrival of our new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, the Honorable Jerry D. Jennings. We have included Mr. Jennings's biography on page 5.

We have had a major turnover of personnel in the Operations Directorate of the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO). Colonel J. R. Atkins assumed his duties as the new Director, Operations Directorate in June. J.R. brings a wealth of operational rescue experience to the job. He is a seasoned Air Force rescue pilot with more than 3400 hours in the H-3 and UH-1 helicopters. His career includes experience as a maintenance officer, tours at Headquarters, Military Airlift Command and the U.S. USMC Command and Staff College, and command of the 1st Helicopter Squadron at Andrews AFB.

Mel Richmond retired from the U.S. Army in September 2000, changed clothes, moved his office to the other side of the wall and assumed duties as the office's Personnel Recovery Program Analyst (read that as "continuity" as all the military folks transition in and out).

We also have had an almost complete turnover of Personnel Recovery Policy advisors. Lt Col Clair Gilk and Major Brenda Mangente, both of whom played key roles in our initial efforts to establish a policy umbrella for DoD's

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Message from the DASD Hon. Jerry D. Jennings

I want to begin by telling you that I feel privileged to be a part of this great personnel recovery community. As I witnessed the events unfold on September 11th, I, like most Americans, was entranced by the courage and selfless dedication to others that was displayed by the police, firemen, and paramedics rushing to the points of danger. While watching, I couldn't help but reflect on the similar role you play on today's battlefield—selflessly placing yourselves in harm's way "That Others May Live"—a critical and noble mission.

As the policy proponent for personnel recovery, I see myself as your advocate, your voice with the senior leadership of both DoD and the Nation. To that end, I have directed my staff to develop, coordinate, and forward to the President for signature, a national statement of priority for the recovery and accounting missions. It is critical that all soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines going into a hostile environment do so confident in the knowledge that their country will not leave them behind. You should be seeing this in final coordination very soon.

As I begin to orient myself on this mission, I see that much has improved over the past few years, but realize that we still have far to go. I am continuing to focus on our goal to create a fully integrated personnel recovery architecture that ensures the Department's ability to recover its isolated personnel successfully.

My priority is simple. The Department must have a powerful and credible capability to recover isolated or missing American personnel. We must ensure that we have the best trained, best equipped, and

best led forces possible to effect such recoveries.

I have directed my staff to work with Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff, the Services, the other Combatant Commands, and whoever else is necessary, to craft a strategic plan for where we need to go over the next five to ten years. But first, we need to know where we want to finish before we can continue the journey effectively.

Personnel recovery must be a priority with the Services and in the combatant commands. It should be a task in every command's Joint Mission Essential Task

List to ensure the recovery function is adequately resourced. We must embed full spectrum personnel recovery scenarios into every major joint and combined exercise. Simply, we must train as we fight.

My priority in the area of acquisition is the rapid fielding of the Combat Survivor Evader Locator system. We must get this revolutionary capability in the hands of the warfighter as quickly as possible.

Funding for the Personnel Recovery Battle Lab is equally important to the success of our efforts to build and sustain a credible recovery capability. We must have a way to test new technologies and procedures, and the Battle Lab will provide such a venue.

In closing, I want you to understand that I am committed to supporting you. If an event is occurring that you believe I would benefit from observing, please let my staff know. If there is an issue for which you need my support, do not hesitate to enlist our support. Together, we can "Keep the Promise" to all our Service and civilian personnel and their families.

— Jerry Jennings



DCI Directs Establishment of the Intelligence Community POW/MIA Analytic Cell

The Intelligence Community Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (IC POW/MIA) Analytic Cell has recently been established under Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) lead. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) assigned the Director, DIA, the mission as a result of language in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.

Congress and the DCI directed that the cell establish and maintain an analytic capability within the Intelligence Community (IC) with responsibility for supporting activities related to those who are listed as prisoners of war and personnel missing as of December 31, 1990. Activating the cell gives the IC the capability to support current and future POW/MIA intelligence analysis and production.

The primary responsibilities of the IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell are to:

- Produce baseline POW/MIA assessments and intelligence products supporting Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-directed plans and operations.
- Establish a surge response capability to meet crisis or special analytic requirements.
- Drive all-source intelligence collection on POW/MIA issues.
- Task and evaluate new reporting on historic POW/MIA cases in coordination with the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Office (DPMO).
- Develop doctrine for analysis and intelligence support to POW/MIA and personnel recovery issues.

The cell consists of representatives from throughout the IC who specialize in infrastructure and facilities analysis, counterintelligence, information operations, intelligence collection management, regional analysis, personnel recovery analysis, and medical intelligence. The cell will also coordinate POW/MIA issues closely with DPMO, the Joint Forces Intelligence Center, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, the Joint Staff, and the Unified Commands.

DIA began planning for the activation of the cell in August 2001 and it became fully operational on September 19th in response to

the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Currently, the IC POW/MIA Analytic Cell is supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM from its facility at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center on Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.



The Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory And Life Sciences Artifact Section

By Dr. Robert S. Browning

Tucked away in an unobtrusive, almost anonymous facility at Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, is one of the most unique laboratories in the Department of Defense—the Air Force Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory. First established in 1983 as the Life Support Equipment Investigation Laboratory, the laboratory initially occupied a single small room within an engineering facility at Kelly Air Force Base. Its function was to investigate problems discovered with life support equipment; however, it was quickly drawn into investigating Air Force mishaps, for which it provided expert analysis of the performance of life sciences equipment in these mishaps.

The range of military systems falling into the category of life sciences equipment is larger than is often assumed. It actually consists of a diverse array of items, including most variants of flight apparel, uniforms, combat gear (all varieties of hand-carried weapons and associated equipment), aircraft fixed or ejection seats, most forms of parachutes and other aerodynamic decelerators, life rafts and personal flotation devices, avionic communications, and visual signaling devices. A wide assortment of specialized survival, escape, and evasion items and other specialized items of equipment, such as body armor and personal identification media are also included in this category. In general, life sciences equipment can be defined as everything worn or carried on a person, and anything that connects the individual to the vehicle or aircraft systems. The category is not necessarily limited to aviation equipment, however. It is broad enough to include the various types of clothing, weapons, and personal equipment carried by ground personnel as well.



In 1992, the laboratory was renamed the Life Sciences Equipment Laboratory (LSEL), a change in title that reflected its evolving and expanding responsibilities. By this time, in addition to assisting Air Force Mishap Investigation Boards and providing engineering and scientific analysis to the development of life support equipment, the Laboratory also became a venue for the training of Life Support Technicians and Life Support Officers, giving them vital exposure to the methods of mishap investigation and the opportunity to test their skills in a series of scenarios. In these scenarios, students are presented recovered materials from previously investigated mishaps and asked to develop conclusions about what those materials can tell them concerning the causes of a mishap. To date, over 3,500 students have passed through this combination of classroom and practical instruction.

In January 2000, the laboratory relocated to Brooks Air Force Base, taking over some 20,000 square feet of newly constructed workspace in Building 578, the headquarters of the 311th Human Systems Wing Program Office. And, while the work of the laboratory supporting Air

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USAF Seeks 132 New Helicopters For Combat Search-And-Rescue Mission

Reprinted from *Inside The Air Force*, November 23, 2001, Pg. 8

By **Adam J. Hebert**

The Air Force has decided on a plan to procure 132 medium-lift helicopters to replace its aging fleet of 105 overtaxed HH-60s used for combat search-and-rescue missions, according to service officials.

Service officials said they hope to have new aircraft delivered by 2010, and will take the recommendation before the Pentagon's top requirements panel for approval next year.

The existing fleet of light-lift HH-60 Pave Low helicopters is considered a high-demand, low-density asset, but an expanded fleet of more capable aircraft with more cabin space "will adequately address the force structure" concerns in the future, according to a command official.

The Air Force Requirements Oversight Council validated the new CSAR requirement in August, according to Maj. Dave Morgan, who led the analysis of alternatives for the combat command at Langley Air Force Base, VA.

An ACC study in June found a medium-lift helicopter to be the most cost-effective solution to meet future requirements, winning out over upgraded HH-60s, tilt rotors and other options (*Inside the Air Force*, July 6, p1).

Morgan told ITAF this week, the service is currently drafting and coordinating a CSAR operational requirements document to take before the Pentagon's Joint Requirements Oversight Council in August 2002. Morgan said firm milestone decision dates will be determined after JROC approval, and once program funding is put in place.

Another Air Force official said the as yet unbudgeted program will probably see a request for proposals issued in fiscal year 2004 or FY-05. Currently, without funding, Morgan stressed that ACC has made "no commitment" to purchase the aircraft, although potential vendors are moving forward with plans to compete for the future work.

According to industry analysts, there are two aircraft considered the primary competitors for the future CSAR mission: The Lockheed Martin/AgustaWestland US101 and the Sikorsky S-92 — two aircraft found to be "representative" of the needs identified in the AOA.

Neither aircraft is currently in use by the U.S. military, and industry analysts agree that getting the Air Force CSAR award would be a bonanza for the winning program.

In anticipation of future business, Lockheed Martin announced



late last month it is entering into a joint agreement with AgustaWestland to produce a version of the European EH101 helicopter, converted for U.S. use. According to an Oct. 31 release, "immediate plans include establishing core teams from both companies to launch marketing campaigns directed towards military markets."

According to Lockheed Martin, exact details of the arrangements are still undetermined. Airframes will likely be imported from Europe and integrated with missionized avionics, engines and software in the United States. Lockheed spokesman Mike Drake said this week the US101 is a "logical extension" of the company's aircraft integration experience, including work as the prime integrator of the EH101 used by the British.

Sikorsky spokesman Ed Steadham said he believes the S-92 is "the right size for the mission. It has the larger cabin ACC is looking for, and is easily transportable. The S-92 can easily go onto a C-5 or a C-17 without breaking it down to any great extent," he noted. Sikorsky is looking to have the aircraft FAA certified by end of 2002, and the S-92 will be ready for production in 2003.


Winning a 132-unit contract would be akin to "winning the lottery" for either company, according to Teal Group aviation analyst Richard Aboulafia.

Although the EH101 is an established aircraft overseas, an ACC purchase would not only get Lockheed's foot in the door to the domestic military rotorcraft market, but would be larger than the total international sales of the helicopter to date, several analysts said. Aboulafia noted that breaking into the U.S. is key, because of the relatively small market left for the EH101 overseas.

Setting up shop in the United States and pushing for U.S. content is critical, Aboulafia added, because "you've got to attract the attention of local politicians with local content," to secure support for the program.

For the S-92, one analyst noted that although it is being sold as a civil program first, it would be Sikorsky's "dream" to sell the aircraft to a military customer. Aboulafia added that the CSAR mission may be the S-92's "best shot" for a military contract.

— **Adam J. Hebert**



2002 DoD Personnel Recovery Conference

The Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) and United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) will co-chair the fifth DoD Personnel Recovery Conference at the Hyatt Regency Crystal City Hotel, Arlington, Virginia, August 6-8, 2002. The National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) will host the conference. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, the Honorable Jerry D. Jennings and Commander-in-Chief, USJFCOM, General William F. Kernan, invite you to participate in this important policy and operational level conference.

As in the past, the primary goal of the 2002 conference will be to build upon the successes of previous conferences and continue increasing the awareness of personnel recovery requirements. Our objective is to stimulate an exchange of ideas that will frame an aggressive DoD strategy to take personnel recovery into the next century. Conference participants will examine personnel recovery issues, discuss their current status, and find solutions or recommend courses of action for those requiring resolution at the DoD level.

Attendance and active participation by key members of the personnel recovery community are crucial to a successful DoD personnel recovery program. In addition to

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THE GLOBAL PERSONNEL RECOVERY SYSTEM (GPRS)

The Next Generation Search and Rescue Capability

Mr. Rich Cole, Innovative Solutions, Inc.

Recovering U.S. evaders during combat operations is traditionally a costly effort. In Vietnam, for every 1.8 U.S. Navy combat search and rescue (CSAR) recovery, one CSAR crewman was killed. For every 1.4 recoveries, one CSAR aircraft was lost. The Navy successfully recovered only nine percent of the downed flight personnel they targeted for CSAR. Likewise, U.S. Air Force CSAR efforts in North Vietnam experienced one CSAR crewman and two CSAR aircraft lost for every 9.2 recoveries. Our most recent experiences in Desert Storm and Bosnia reveal no significant improvement in this capability.

The Joint CSAR Joint Test and Evaluation of the CSAR mission area found that a major contributor to mission failure was the lack of a command, control, and communication system capable of satisfying CSAR requirements and providing a real time link between the evader/survivor and the rescue force. These deficiencies often require launching recovery platforms and support forces prior to determining the location and condition of the evader/survivor. Searching costs lives and resources.

GPRS is a concept that grew from the desire to meet the above-listed mission deficiencies. The initiative is about two years old and is a combination of civil and military requirements. The architecture calls for a combined package to be integrated on to the GPS Block IIF/III constellation, a minimum of four to six ground "Gateways" for data handling and processing, and user segments consisting of base stations and user devices (PCM size cards). A portion of the system will be dedicated to DoD/Civil agency/NATO Allies' use with the primary mission being that of personnel recovery. The other portion of the system will service 406 MHz emergency beacons used with the existing Search and Rescue Satellite (SARSAT) distress alerting and locating system. Although used primarily in civilian applications, the 406 MHz capability provides a backup for military forces under non-hostile conditions. The architecture allows two normally exclusive requirements, application and access, to co-exist without compromising security or mission requirements. Civil SAR

has specific mission applications with unlimited access requirements by civil communities, while DoD and government agencies have much broader applications with restricted user access.

- The space segment: A simple, integrated "Bent Pipe" hardware suite containing UHF (406MHz) and commercial S-Band transponders. No processing will occur onboard the space vehicle.
- The ground segment: Consists of two components: the Gateway and the Network Management.
 - The Gateway consists of feeder links and processing hardware. The feeder links are comprised of eight, 3-6m ground antennas. The ground antennas enable the system to track GPS satellites in view and process user transmissions.
 - The Network Management consists of software and switching hardware that manages where the messages are sent within the network.

The Civil user segment will consist of a 406 MHz transponder with an imbedded GPS chip. Future beacons also will possess a limited two-way capability to enable Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs) to confirm emergency and verify survivor status, thereby significantly reducing false alarms.

The DoD/government user equipment has two components: the base station and the user device. The base station is simply a laptop or PC that allows a particular user organization to control their network of devices. The DoD/Government user segment is unique in that the core capability resides on a PCM size card that can be integrated into any number of devices. The base station allows the user

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SimSAR Project Helps Visualize International Civil SAR Procedures

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs (ISA) has responsibility for fostering enhanced relationships with countries throughout the globe. Military-to-military discussions often serve as the precursor to broader international dialogue. Initial meetings focus on issues of mutual interest and minimal controversy. Civil Search and Rescue (SAR) is a prime, often-used topic for such discussions. Traditionally, these meetings have been guided by PowerPoint briefings to display and discuss relevant topics, such as international SAR organizations, capabilities, and cooperation. Content had to be general in nature because of language barriers and limited common understanding of roles and procedures.

Purpose and Description of SimSAR

DPMO is sponsoring the development of an enhanced, simulation-based discussion tool (SimSAR) to address coordination procedures at the Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) level. SimSAR developers (IITRI) have been tasked to create an incident management scenario and briefing, enhanced with the integration

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The Honorable Jerry D. Jennings Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/Missing Personnel Affairs)

The Honorable Jerry D. Jennings was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs in August. Mr. Jennings is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for policy, control and oversight of all matters pertaining to missing personnel, and for establishing uniform policies and procedures leading to the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing in action from all conflicts. This mission includes the rescue of individuals who fall in harm's way as a result of combat. Previously, he was Chairman and CEO of the Phoenix Communications and Research Company in Vienna, Virginia.

In 1990, he was appointed by President Bush and confirmed by the Senate to serve as Deputy Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. While at FEMA, he served as its acting director and deputy director through 1992. He was responsible for the agency's three directorates, the Federal Insurance Administration and the U.S. Fire Administration.

Mr. Jennings was appointed by President Reagan in 1986 to serve as the Acting Director of the Selective Service system, and he also served as Deputy Director of that agency until 1990.

From 1982 until late 1986 he served in the Executive Office of the President as the Executive Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. During the same period, he served as Executive Director of the White House Science Council.

He served as advisor to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs under four presidents from 1973 to 1982. From the Nixon through the Reagan administrations, he was responsible for

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SERE Training at the Home of Army Aviation

By
Major Mark Taylor

DoD Instruction 1300.21 requires that all combat aircrews receive formal Level C Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) training at least once in their career. During the annual DoD Personal Recovery Conference, conference participants recognized in the SERE training workgroup that the Army was not in compliance with the Instruction. The Army's ability to meet the requirement is inadequate and not resourced. The Army Aviation Modernization Plan incorporated Level C SERE and over-water training as a required skill to meet current and future operational requirements.

1-145th Avn Regt, 1st Avn Bde currently executes a Level B SERE course for all Lieutenants and Warrant Officers. The course was certified Level B by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (USAJFKSWC) which is the proponent for SERE training. A four-

man accreditation team conducted the evaluation at Fort Rucker May 7-9, 2001. The current Level B consists of the following:

Field Training Objectives:

- Land Survival
- Land Navigation/Evasion
- Link Up Procedures
- Hide Site Operations
- Personnel Recovery Procedures
- Repatriation

SERE Academics

- | | |
|--|---------|
| • Survival Medicine | 2.0 hrs |
| • Physiology of Food | 1.0 hrs |
| • Procurement of Food and Water | 2.0 hrs |
| • Land Navigation, Fire making, and Shelters | 2.0 hrs |



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DODI 2310.5, "ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING PERSONS"

By
Mr. Jim Gravelle
DPMO General Counsel

The Missing Service Personnel Act of 1995 (MSPA), Title 10, United States Code Sections 1501-1513 (1996), statutorily affects the entire accounting spectrum from survival training to the exhaustion of all leads regarding personnel accounting.

The MSPA affects the accounting spectrum by placing three general requirements upon the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). First, the SECDEF must establish within OSD an office responsible for DoD policy relating to missing persons. Second, the SECDEF is required to establish policies throughout DoD for personnel recovery (including search, rescue, escape, and evasion). The establishment of DPMO and the issuance of various publications concerning personnel recovery have satisfied these two requirements.

Third, the SECDEF is required to prescribe uniform DoD procedures for determining the status of missing persons, and the systematic, comprehensive, and timely collection, analysis, review, dissemination, and periodic update of information related to such persons. Additionally, these procedures must be prescribed in a single directive applicable to all DoD elements. The publication of the 98-page DoD Instruction (DoDI) 2310.5, "Accounting for Missing Persons" (January 31, 2000), fulfills the third requirement and completes the implementation of the MSPA.

The DoDI implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures regarding missing persons to be followed by military department boards of inquiry and officials reviewing the reports of such boards; for the determination of the status of covered persons; and for the systemic, comprehensive, and timely collection, analysis, review, dissemination, and periodic update of information related to such persons. The length of the DoDI is dictated by the fact that it meets the requirements of containing the procedures regarding missing persons for all of DoD, and is a user-friendly document that contains various aids for the user such as sample forms and schematics of the individual procedures.

The DoDI assigns specific responsibilities to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control, Communications, and Intelligence, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs, and Secretaries of the Military Departments. Encl 2 contains pertinent and helpful definitions. The content of the DoDI generally follows the sequence found in the MSPA; e.g., Enclosure (Encl) 3 of the DoDI implements Section 1502, Encl 4 implements Section 1503, and so forth.

- Encl 2: Commander's preliminary assessment and recommendation
- Encl 4: Secretarial review and appointment of initial board
- Encl 5: Subsequent boards of inquiry
- Encl 6: Further review boards
- Encl 7: Case resolution files



- Encl 8: Pre-enactment boards

In addition to implementing the MSPA, the DoDI implements policy, assigns responsibility, and prescribes procedures for the Armed Forces Identification Review Board (AFIRB) at Encl 9. Previously, the AFIRB was a creature of memorandum. Including the related procedures of the AFIRB in the DoDI gave the AFIRB permanence and clear OSD sanction.

The DoDI is extremely user friendly. For example, it provides definitions to help the user understand the terminology, forms for the various boards to use for recording their actions taken, schematics that detail the individual procedures, and a variety of form letters for various officials to use in accomplishing their tasks.

Paragraph E3.1.6, and Attachment 4, of Encl 3 provide a discussion and pictorial representation of the relationship between Personnel Recovery and the requirements for status determination under the provisions of the MSPA. In addition, it sets forth the reminder that the scope of persons for whom the United States will undertake recovery is not limited to situations involving hostile action (e.g., training exercises).

Sections 1508, 1510, 1511, and 1512 of the MSPA do not require implementation.

Washington Headquarters Services, The Pentagon, distributes the DoDI and the DoD forms contained therein on the Internet at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/>. Once at this site, to access the DoDI, click on "INSTRUCTIONS" under the "DoD Issuances" column and then scroll down to "DODI 2310.5". To access the associated forms, click on "Related Sites" of the above website, then click on "DoD Forms." Next, click on "Department of Defense Forms" and scroll down to the appropriate form (DD2809, DD2910, DD2811 or DD2812). There also is a link at the DoDI web site to the DoD forms contained in the DoDI.

The MSPA statutorily affects the entire accounting spectrum. Publication of the DoDI completes implementation of the MSPA. Not only does publication satisfy the legal requirements of the MSPA, but it will also implement the protections of the MPA for DoD personnel who are placed in harm's way.

GPRS

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
to create and control a virtual network within their organization that is available 24/7 on a global basis. The devices within the organization's network can simply be tracked or completely controlled from any location in the world. The organizational network is segregated and protected from any other user in the system. For joint operations specific devices within separate organizations can be re-keyed over the air and returned to their respective networks when the operation is complete.

The GPRS concept was demonstrated at Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 2000 in September 2000. The demonstration combined military and civil scenarios at different locations to highlight the capabilities of the system. This demonstration was the first time that rescue forces, command and control, and the survivor/evader were able to communicate with each other in near real time over the horizon.

The military scenario was conducted at Nellis AFB, Nevada and the civil scenario was off the coast of Texas near Corpus Christi. Both scenarios were run simultaneously and tracked near real time from the Air Force Council room at the Pentagon, the Combined Air Operations Center Forward at Nellis, and a conference room at Joint Forces Command in Norfolk. This scenario involved two HH-60's recovering a simulated downed pilot from the desert in Nevada. GPRS allowed the HH-60's to

precisely locate and communicate with the survivor/evader over-the-horizon well before the recovery. The system also allowed the HH-60's to use Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) information to verify evader identification so that minimum time was spent in the landing zone.

The civil scenario highlighted the system's interoperability. The Coast Guard received an alert from a simulated "distressed" vessel off the coast of Texas. The RCC dispatched a GPRS equipped cutter from Corpus Christi for the rescue. The RCC also requested support from US Customs Service (USCS) to locate and relay vessel status. A GPRS equipped USCS P-3 located the vessel, relayed that the vessel had sunk and survivors were in the water. The RCC tasked an USCG Falcon to respond by dropping a raft to the survivors. All coordination took place using the GPRS except for tasking the Falcon. On two days during the evaluation the scenario in Texas was interrupted when real-world taskings came from the RCC to locate and rescue survivors from two vessels in distress. The GPRS performed flawlessly and helped the USCG save several lives.



LSEL

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Force Mishap Investigation Boards, student instruction, and analytical support of various research and development programs continued, the majority of its personnel were involved in a far different mission—acting as the single facility within DoD for all life sciences equipment artifact investigations relating to the national effort to resolve the status of missing and unaccounted for personnel.

This completely unique mission arose from a series of successful efforts in the late 1980s to use recovered artifacts from aircraft loss sites in Southeast Asia to determine the final status of the aviators involved. Existing knowledge of what careful analysis of life sciences equipment can tell investigators about the presence and actions of personnel involved in aviation mishaps provides a basic foundation for analysts to study recovered equipment to account for the presence of individuals at historic mishap and crash sites—especially in the cases (which in Southeast Asia means nearly always) where no human remains can be found, or when human remains that were found failed to provide enough evidence through which traditional forensic methods could make possible a definite accounting.

In 1993, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized this previously unknown method of providing a final accounting for missing personnel and designated the laboratory as a support agency to the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA) in Hawaii. When congressional funding supported this designation, the lab activated the Life Sciences Artifact Section on April 5, 1994. Maintaining a large collection of reference items, a steadily expanding technical library, and an array of contacts with retired military personnel and other specialists in various types of equipment, laboratory analysts began the effort of piecing to-

gether the clues that will provide a final answer regarding the fate of missing service personnel.

Teams organized by JTF-FA undertook recovery operations on identified crash or mishap sites in Southeast Asia, following standard archeological practices to literally dig artifacts from the ground using locally hired labor. On site, specialists sifted through the earth to retrieve artifacts, which were then bagged and sent to the laboratory. There, specialists in the Artifact Section analyzed each case, with the first step being a careful inventory of all the items sent to the lab. Each bag of recovered artifacts was then photographed by experienced forensic photographers and identified for later reference.



Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment

By Lieutenant General (Retired) "Rock" Brett and Robert Mohan (IDA)

NATO EXERCISE CLEAN HUNTER

NATO Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) #4

Messtetton, Germany, 6-8 June 2000

Command and control of the first Joint-Combined CSAR event for Exercise Clean Hunter 2000 was at NATO CAOC #4, located in Messtetten, Germany. CAOC #4 was led by Lieutenant General Dirk Bocher, Commander of the German Air Force (GAF); the Deputy Commander, Air Vice-Marshal (AVM) M. J. Gardiner, Royal Air Force (RAF); and the Director of Operations, Colonel G.J. Stoop, Netherlands Air Force (NAF). Colonel Stoop provided an excellent briefing on the CAOC, which also gave a pertinent rundown on how the CAOC integrated into all the commands within the region. Of importance are the many personnel slots within the CAOC that are not "flagged;" i.e., the responsible countries have not indicated their willingness to fill them. Also of significance is the fact that immediately after the conclusion of Clean Hunter, all USAF personnel slots were to be eliminated. This is important for several reasons. USAF personnel have unique knowledge on systems that are only in the USAF inventory, such as Sandys, Rivet Joint, etc. Moreover, USAF personnel know how to interface with USAF Commands and where to go for systems help. Also, U.S. personnel should be present whenever any U.S. military systems are employed: Air Force, Army, Navy, or Marine. It is obvious from the briefing that the CAOC's are in the forefront of operational control of combat and combat support forces. Therefore, it is critical that U.S. Military personnel be in the control loop.

The Combined Rescue Coordination Center (CRCC) was set up in a large room adjacent to the CAOC Operations Center. A computer system allowed for projecting information on the front wall of the room. In this manner, all involved could readily keep track of the current actions pertaining to a Search and Rescue (SAR) or a Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). This was important, as the CAOC #4 training events for Clean Hunter included both a SAR and a CSAR, which involved live, real-time actions. The SAR and CSAR Incident Reports (IR) were displayed on the wall and kept current so anyone who

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The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) is providing analytical support for the Defense POW and Missing Personnel Affairs Office (DPMO) in the assessment of personnel recovery efforts in a coalition environment during Operations Other Than War.

EXERCISE COOPERATIVE KEY 2001

A Partnership for Peace Exercise

Exercise Cooperative Key 2001 (CK 01) took place in the vicinity of Plovdiv, Bulgaria from September 10–20 September 2001. Twenty-Four European nations participated in the exercise with most furnishing military operational aircraft that included fighters, airlift, and helicopters. Additionally, there were Special Operations Force (SOF) ground elements from several of the nations, to include a force reconnaissance company of United States Marines. It was a major live exercise with numerous flying missions involving a mix of both the aircraft and ground forces of the involved nations. Missions included combat fighter air defense, ground attack and reconnaissance sorties: SOF air drops, both high and low; and numerous helicopter missions involving Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), MEDEVAC, non-combatant evacuation and re-supply.

Specifically, CK 01 was a Partnership for Peace (PfP) field training exercise (FTX) that allowed NATO and Partner Nations to practice and refine interoperability in a wide variety of actual flying missions. The exercise replicated actual command and control systems in real time using a Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) Aircraft furnished by NATO, and individual aircraft control systems. The first five days of the exercise (11 to 15 September) were dedicated to in-briefings, ground and flight training, and setting up the various operations and control centers, plus USAF officers and non-commissioned officers trained for certain selected missions.



Within Europe, the significant differences among the countries of the NATO alliance are magnified when the PfP nations are included in an exercise. While the PfP coalition includes some Western European countries, it also includes a number of former Eastern Bloc countries. Most senior officers from these former Warsaw Pact countries speak Russian, rather than English, as a second language. In addition there is a variety of both NATO and Warsaw Pact equipment with the basic tactics, techniques, procedures and doctrine coming from a very different basic source. These differences, coupled with the variety of equipment from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, presents at

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Army Aviation SERE Training

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- Travel, Personal Protection, and Camouflage 1.0 hrs
 - Evasion 1.0 hrs
 - Introduction to Resistance 2.0 hrs
 - PW Exploitation 3.0 hrs
 - PW Organization 2.0 hrs
 - Tactical Interrogation 4.0 hrs
- 20 hrs

The Road to Level C: Representatives from Directorate for Training and Doctrine at the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School briefed the Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation Center on October, 24, 2001. The briefing highlighted the Special Warfare Center's (SWC) role as the Army's proponent for Level C SERE train-

ing. SWC proposed an interim solution for USAAVNC to expand its current Level B to Level C until SWC can expand and train the Army requirement.

A 1st Aviation Brigade planning group is conducting the Mission Analysis to identify requirements and resources to implement.



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came into the room could, see with a quick glance, the status of the rescues. There also were several computer stations available to the CRCC Team Members. The one weak area was communications, particularly voice, which was unreliable and, for interface with Unit Operations Centers, not standard. Additionally, the only secure voice capability was in the Operations Center, which, when working, was overloaded.

The CRCC Team consisted of seven officers, four from the German Air Force, one from the Italian Air Force (IAF), one from the Netherlands Air Force, and one from the USAF. The USAF Officer was Major Bill Caldwell from the 32nd Air Operations Squadron at Ramstein AB, Germany. He is a very experienced PR/CSAR individual, who brought with him several PR/CSAR forms that were not held by the CAOC, and were put immediately to use. The CRCC Team Leader was a GAF Captain who was assigned to the CAOC. He was also responsible for close air support (CAS) activities in the Operations Center, so his time was split between the two tasks. The other three GAF Officers all had PR/CSAR experience with one having served a TDY tour at the Balkans CAOC at Vicenza, Italy. The Italian officer was a rated helicopter pilot. He proved to be a significant help in the CSAR rescue operation since an Italian Helicopter was employed during the operation, among others. Of great use was a Sandy-qualified A-10 pilot from the 81st Fighter Squadron, and an F-16 pilot from Spangdahlem AB, Germany. Both of these officers were TDY to the CAOC from their parent units. The Sandys and F-16s participating in the SAR and CSAR events were from their units. These officers were key to setting up the actual rescue Composite Air Operation (COMAO).

There were two rescue events, one SAR and one CSAR, controlled by CAOC #4. The SAR was the first to occur and involved a GAF F-4 that was down in friendly, but uninhabited area requiring a rescue team. In this case, Special Forces were employed to rescue the two crew members, one of whom was injured. The second event was a GAF Tomado down in enemy territory. There was difficulty establishing

initial communications and this persisted for quite some time. In both events, the CRCC Team responded in a professional manner and worked well as a team. They also consulted with various expert members in the Operations Center, which was particularly important with respect to the employment of the Sandys, the USAF F-16s, and the different types of helicopters used in the COMAO. The SAR event was well planned and, after detailed deliberations, it was decided that Special Forces would go in to rescue the downed F-4 crew. This was done without any problems, and in a timely manner. Throughout the event, all actions were carefully and calmly considered, which for a new, relatively inexperienced team, was commendable.

The CSAR event was much more demanding than the SAR event and really tested the CRCC Team and supporting personnel from the Operations Center. However, throughout the exercise, all CRCC Team members and Operations Center experts moved with deliberate speed and attempted to consider all of the factors involved. Communication with the downed Tornado pilots was, at first, non-existent and, throughout the event, was spotty and unreliable. Because of this, consideration was given to using a reconnaissance aircraft to take photos and other products to authenticate reporting. The idea was abandoned because authentication was finally obtained via voice communications. In addition to the experts from the Operations Center, the CRCC Team worked closely with the Intelligence Team, who gave them periodic updates on the enemy order of battle in the area of the downed aircrew. Working closely with the Sandy, F-16, and helicopter crews, the CRCC Team put together an effective and realistic COMAO. It consisted of four USAF F-16CJs conducting RESCAP and SEAD; two GAF ECR TORNADOs performing SEAD; four USAF A-10s conducting RESCORT and Airborne FAC; two USAF F-16CGs performing CAS; a NATO AEW E-3 acting as the Airborne Mission Coordinator (AMC); and three recovery helicopters: a NAF CH-47, an IAF HH-3F, and a GAF UH-1D.

The actual mission was accomplished effectively with the Sandys flying to the helicopter air base for face-to-face briefings. This ensured

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"Forging the Warrior Spirit"

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the needed CONOPS coordination was done, in light of the fact that the use of Sandys in a COMAO was new to the pilots and crews of the helicopters.

It should be noted that the AEW E-3 was an "Airborne Mission Coordinator," and not a "Commander." There was a lot of discussion about the difference between a "Coordinator" and a "Commander." This difference needs to be standardized in the future as to whom or what system is to be the "Airborne Mission Commander" versus the "Airborne Mission Coordinator." From the CAOC Deputy Commander down, there was a positive consensus that more CSAR/SAR exercises must take place, and with greater frequency. This was a valuable experience for all involved personnel, and all personnel demonstrated dedication and professionalism in their assigned duties.

NATO Combined Air Operations Center #1

Karup, Denmark, 13-14 June 2000

Command and control of the second of two Joint-Combined CSAR events for Exercise Clean Hunter 2000 was conducted at NATO CAOC #1, located in Karup, Denmark. The CRCC was the Blue Cell for which the exercise event was intended for training. The CRCC staff consisted of six personnel: Commander Merten, German Navy, was the CRCC Director and the only staff member permanently assigned to the CAOC. Captain Dall, Royal Danish Air Force, was the Deputy Director, augmenting the exercise from his normal duties as Commandant of the Danish Combat Support School where SERE training is conducted. Additionally, there was a Danish Special Forces LNO, two Danish Intelligence Specialists, and Major Tom Sebens, from the 32nd Air Operations Squadron (AOS) at Ramstein Air Base, a USAF rescue helicopter pilot. Major Mark "Snapper" Mattison, USAF, was the exercise planner from NATO Regional HQ Air North, the NATO HHQ component for the CAOC. Snapper represented the White Cell for the exercise event.

NATO CAOC #1 is permanently manned with approximately 70 personnel. While all NATO Nations are responsible for manning, the vast majority of the personnel assigned are from Denmark, with Britain and Germany providing significant numbers. No U.S. personnel were permanently assigned to CAOC #1. Augmentation for Clean Hunter 2000 was approximately ten personnel, four of whom were US personnel. The CRCC consumed most of the augmentees, since it was the only CAOC cell that did not have a permanently-assigned standing cadre.

Major Mattison provided the scenario overview to CAOC guests and observers. The exercise was an integrated command post exercise (CPX) and field training exercise (FTX) that incorporated the actual decision makers, live recovery forces, and actual "survivors" in the field that had to be recovered. The scenario began with a German Tornado going down and two aircrew men ejecting over water in the Baltic several hundred yards off the coast. The survivors had to make it to shore, where they had to evade live OPFOR search parties, survive, and make contact with friendly forces to effect their recovery. Each morning, over the course of the planning and execution of the recovery, mission status was briefed. During the CAOC morning briefs, it was made clear by the CAOC leadership that until the CSAR training event was successfully concluded, it was going to be the main



emphasis of the "war" being fought from the CAOC.

The recovery force consisted of a Royal Danish Navy submarine and Royal Danish Army Special Forces (frogmen). Airborne command and control was executed by German tactical reconnaissance aircraft and British maritime patrol aircraft serving as communications relays. Even before the recovery mission was launched, the CRCC staff was challenged by multiple languages, a communications architecture built of components from many countries, the harsh weather of the North Sea, and other difficulties common to Joint and Combined operations. The flow of intelligence on enemy capabilities and intent to the CRCC was limited. The intelligence specialists acknowledged the problem and attributed it to the lack of exercise intelligence "inputs" to the scenario, and limitations on the releasability of classified information from the National Intelligence Centers (NICs) of the various countries participating. They said, "Every country has a problem with releasability to other countries, but the US has the worst restrictions in NATO." They cited the alliance of SCANIC countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) as a better example of close cooperation and releasability among allies.

The German Air Force squadron that "lost" the Tornado and the two downed airmen sent their EPA and ISOPREPs to the CRCC electronically via a German C4I system called 'EIFEL.' EIFEL reports could only come into the CAOC on special, dedicated machines, limiting their interoperability. The Germans use the first page of the U. S. ISOPREP format that contains text only. The system is quite fast (Germany to Denmark in about 12 minutes) and the resolution quality of the products is very high. The Germans use block 19 of the ISOPREP to provide the Phoenix IR flasher code to be used by the isolated person.

The frogmen were delivered to the submarine via Danish SAR helicopter, and in turn, the submarine delivered them to the shootdown location. The frogmen egressed the submerged submarine, went ashore, established radio contact with the survivors, linked up with them, took them by raft out to the submarine, and boarded, all under cover of darkness. During the boarding process, one of the survivors was "injured" and his condition deteriorated through the night, as the submarine evaded enemy surface ships. The next day, the survivor had deteriorated to the point that he required immediate evacuation to a hospital, but the submarine was still in enemy waters. A CSARTF was

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COOPERATIVE KEY

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the outset serious challenges. In spite of these significant challenges, it was amazing and inspirational how effectively the militaries operated together throughout the exercise.

Two Bulgarian airfields in the vicinity of the city of Plovdiv were used for the exercise. The exercise Headquarters, the CAOC, and all fighters and helicop-

ters were located at Graf Ignatievo Airfield, which had been significantly upgraded prior to the exercise. The HQ and CAOC were housed in a rather new and modern building, and the airfield was well suited for all aspects of fighter and helicopter operations. In addition, a company of U.S. Marines, along with some other countries' Special Forces troops, were billeted in a hangar at Graf Ignatievo. Airlift aircraft and the NATO AWACS were stationed at Krumovo/Plovdiv Airport, the local commercial airport for Plovdiv. The rules on low-level flight operations and other flying operations, which were not restrictive, allowed for realistic and freewheeling flight operations for both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The extensive actual flying area promoted an excellent training environment. With the exception of Alaska, this is probably the best environment we have seen for a live flying exercise in several years.

The CAOC was the focal point for all facets of the operational missions held the second week of the exercise (17 through 20 September). The CAOC equipment and experienced key personnel were furnished by NATO's AIRSOUTH Command in Naples, Italy. In fact, AIRSOUTH personnel accomplished a majority of the planning for the exercise. AIRSOUTH also furnished the Exercise Director and key personnel throughout all exercise areas. The CAOC consisted of a combat plans section and a combat operations section, which is normal for NATO operations. Combat plans generated Air Tasking Orders (ATOs), and combat operations executed them. The Joint Search and Rescue Coordination Cell (JSRCC) was located in the first row of the combat operations room which was an ideal location for them with respect to rapidly coordinating their CSAR missions.

Seven PfP nations furnished helicopters for CSAR events. Additionally, Switzerland furnished a PUMA helicopter configured for medical evacuation and SAR, and the USAF provided four A-10s with experienced CSAR aircrews. In every respect, the CSAR events provided much needed training for all participants – most of whom had never participated in CSAR events. The nations and their helicopters are:

- Austria 3 Augusta-Bell 214Ns
- Bulgaria 2 MI-17 Hips; 2 MI-24 Hind Gunships; 1 Bell-206
- Italy 1 Augusta-Bell 212
- Hungary 3 MI-17 Hips
- Romania 2 PUMA SOCAT Gunships

- Slovenia 2 Augusta-Bell 212s
- Slovakia 1 MI-17 Hip
- Switzerland 1 Super PUMA

The training week (11 to 15 September) began with academics on CSAR operations conducted by two experienced USAF majors from the Air Force Special Operations Command at Hurlburt AFB, Florida, and the Air Force Weapons School at Nellis AFB, Nevada, respectively. This training proved invaluable, since almost all of the aircrews had never been involved in a CSAR Task Force, flown with Gunships in formation, or even flown in formation with other helicopters in tactical scenarios. None had ever flown with the A-10s operating in a combat rescue role (Sandy mission). The flight training during this week was dedicated to formation flying since it was not possible to fly with the A-10 squadron. However, the available USAF CSAR-experienced personnel assigned to NATO were able to teach the various PfP aircrews about Joint CSAR tactics, techniques, and procedures, which proved to be valuable for the actual missions the next week. Fortunately, the A-10 aircrews were released to participate in the exercise in time to fly in support of the CSAR Task Forces during the week of 17 to 20 September. In addition, their flight leader briefed with the helicopter crews for each mission, which also proved to be useful.

We observed most of the briefings held by the helicopter crews and the execution of four missions, three of which were CSAR events, during the operational week, 17 to 20 September. The improvement in aircrew knowledge and flying performance was remarkable. One mission was a CSAR mission in which two Hips landed to pick up two survivors. This mission included escort by two Bulgarian MI-24s and two A-10s in the Sandy role. Although there were some mistakes, considering the experience of the aircrews, their overall performance was excellent.

A total of seven CSAR missions were flown, four of which were supported by USAF A-10s. On each mission, there were armed men who acted in the role of security personnel and/or pararescue personnel (PJs). Once on the ground in the survivor's area, these armed men deployed for force protection. The Austrians flew a three-ship CSAR mission to pick up two survivors, one of whom was 'wounded' (in scenario). Two Bulgarian MI-24s and four A-10s escorted the second Austrian mission of three AB-212Ns. A real mix was the CSAR mis-

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Do We Still Need Navy CSAR?

By Commander Gregory Rucci, U.S. Navy

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Combat search and rescue is a vital capability that the Navy would be sorely pressed to lose. Going joint—leaving combat search and rescue to the Air Force or Special Operations Command—likely would create more problems than it would solve.

During the past ten years, the Navy's active-duty helicopter antisubmarine (HS) community has directed a large portion of training time and effort into developing and maintaining an organic combat-search-and-rescue (CSAR) capability within the carrier battle group. This effort has come at the expense of other primary mission areas within the helicopter forces and the carrier air wing. The Navy presently maintains both an active and reserve CSAR capability, leading one to ask whether present force structure provides any benefits or whether it should be altered. In light of the increased emphasis on jointness and the existence of CSAR capabilities within the other services, should the Navy be in the CSAR business at all?

The frequency of our involvement in low-intensity conflicts has risen dramatically. Given a national military strategy of engagement, logic dictates that the Department of Defense (DoD) would make a concerted effort to maintain CSAR capabilities; but this has not been the case.

No one will deny the validity of the mission or its tenets, but CSAR has suffered from neglect throughout DoD. As with other support missions, during each war since 1945 the U.S. military has scrambled to develop a CSAR capability only to let it atrophy quickly after the war. Cost undoubtedly has played a role in the lack of focus placed on CSAR; it is a difficult and dangerous mission. During Vietnam, the Navy lost one additional aircraft for every 1.4 successful rescues and one additional airman for every 1.8 successful rescues.¹ Air Force CSAR statistics reflect similar costs. A post-war Air Force study revealed that, each rescue attempt had cost the military more than \$70,510 in 1973 dollars. What these statistics failed to reveal was that by the end of the war, success rates had improved dramatically as many of the lessons that had been recognized in Korea were relearned and reapplied in Vietnam.² The lessons from these statistics should have been that inadequate equipment and doctrine and limited training greatly increase the dangers of CSAR. Instead, most simply believed that the mission was too risky to fund. During the 1980s, most commanders-in-chief believed that the lethality of the modern battlefield made CSAR too costly to attempt. This attitude still prevails among some Navy leaders.³

After Vietnam, all Navy CSAR capabilities and responsibilities were relegated to the Naval Reserve, where they resided exclusively for almost 20 years. The Reserve Helicopter Combat Support Squadron (HC)-9, manned with many Vietnam veterans,



became the recognized Navy CSAR experts. Moreover, between 1970 and 1990, carrier-based, active-duty HS squadrons concentrated on antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities within the constraints of the Cold War and a bipolar world. The very nature of the U.S.-Soviet conflict, combined with the legacy of Vietnam, curtailed policies aimed at military interventionism, and the lack of an active-duty Navy CSAR capability was not widely perceived as detrimental.

The HH-60H became the Navy's new CSAR aircraft in the 1980s, replacing the H-3. The HH-60H was more powerful, better armored, fully night-vision-goggle compatible, equipped with dual-side suppression weapons, and Hellfire weapon system.⁴ Leveraging the Naval Reserve initiative and funding for the development of a new CSAR aircraft, the HS community ultimately pursued a mix of two HH-60H (CSAR) and four SH-60F (antisubmarine warfare) aircraft to replace the six existing SH3 ASW aircraft in active-duty squadrons. The rationale for this was threefold: the improved ASW capability provided by the four SH-60F aircraft was viewed as equivalent to six SH-3s; the HH-60H was seen as a less-expensive way to augment the air wing and the HS squadrons for their numerous other missions; and the HH-60H would move a true CSAR-capable aircraft back into the active fleet.

In 1989, HC-9 was disestablished and was replaced by two new reserve helicopter combat support squadrons, HCS-4 and HCS-5, each dedicated to CSAR as well as naval special warfare support. HCS-4 and HCS-5 received the new HH-60H aircraft during their establishment, and active-duty HS squadrons began receiving their replacement aircraft in the 1990s. At the conclusion of the Cold War reduced concern over the ASW threat caused a shift in priorities. Navy doctrine moved from concentrating on an open-ocean capability focused on the Soviets—to power projection in the littorals. With this new emphasis, the HS community redirected training efforts toward developing CSAR capabilities.

When the active-duty HS squadrons began training for CSAR, they looked to the reserves for assistance, but cooperation proved difficult.⁵ Reserve assets have had a hard time fitting into the active-duty training/deployment cycles because of the limits under which reserve forces operate. An additional factor inhibiting cooperation has been geographic separation. Reserve squadrons are based at Naval Air Station (NAS) Pt. Mugu and NAS Norfolk; active-duty HS squadrons are located at NAS North Island and NAS Jacksonville. The distance is minor on the West Coast, but it produces a significant barrier to cooperation on the East Coast. The Gulf War highlighted the lack of

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Navy CSAR

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CSAR assets throughout DoD. Active duty HS squadrons in the midst of their transition from the H-3 to the HH-60 aircraft were relegated to low-threat, over-water search-and-rescue missions. Naval Reserve forces were assigned to a base in Saudi Arabia, but the CSAR mission was handed to special operations forces (SOF). After the war, a presidential commission on roles and missions chastised DoD for “having an inappropriate active/reserve force mix and inadequate and improperly deployed forces, conditions that have necessitated tasking Special Operations Command to perform Combat SAR functions.” A follow-on CSAR capabilities study, funded by the Air Force, called for large increases in CSAR mission funding to alleviate this problem.

Since the Gulf War, the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) at NAS Fallon in Nevada has been increasingly emphasizing Navy CSAR training. Ten years ago, a few lecture hours might have been devoted to CSAR during an entire air wing deployment to Fallon. Now, no strike leader plans or briefs without addressing the CSAR contingency. During an air wing's final qualification process, an entire strike is devoted to a CSAR mission in a high-threat area. It is not uncommon to see F/A-18 squadron commanding officers leading these missions in recognition of the mission difficulty and importance. This represents a significant change in attitudes.

During the 1990s, a dramatic shift in expertise from the reserve HCS squadrons to the active-duty HS squadrons has taken place. The reserve squadrons still maintain many highly skilled and capable personnel, but the Vietnam experience brought to HC-9 now is all but gone. With no active-duty base to draw from, the majority of today's reserve CSAR aircrews are homegrown. Pilots come from any number of the active communities—many lacking even basic night vision goggle skills upon which to build. This situation has placed a significant training burden on the reserve squadrons. The mission also has changed so much that even though the legacy of the Vietnam experience still provides value, little remains that is relevant to today's tactics. The reserve forces have maintained the ability to deploy within 72 hours, but transportation problems, presidential-recall limitations, and other constraints have provided serious impediments to their training and

actual employment. Even though the reserve HCS squadrons maintain more than half of the Navy's CSAR aircraft, they moved from being “The Pros from Dover” to merely augmenting active forces.

Night-flying skills deteriorate rapidly without frequent exercise. Estimates from the active-duty helicopter wings indicate that more than 40% of all training time is devoted in some way to CSAR training.⁶ Training proficient nightflying crews has proved difficult even for active-duty forces with the luxury of an entire month to deal with weather and moon-phase constraints. The two weeks a year and one weekend a month reservists devote to training has not allowed them to achieve parity with their active-duty counterparts. These constraints have impacted training to the point where active and reserve crews are unable to follow the same advanced-training matrix.

Although relatively few changes have occurred since DoD was placed on report for providing inadequate CSAR forces during the Gulf War, lack of use always stimulates questions of utility. Although the Navy's CSAR capabilities are generally viewed as on par with other forces inside DoD, Navy assets have been relegated to backup roles during most recent contingencies. Forward-based SOF and Air Force units have handled the majority of primary alerts and taskings throughout the last ten years. There are a number of reasons for this—some logical and others based on concern over interservice competition and limited funds.

The Navy does not have equipment or capabilities equivalent to those contained in certain SOF units, which permit those units to penetrate into well-defended, high-threat areas. In certain theaters, continually rotated ground-based Air Force units provide the advantage of continuity—something impossible to attain with rotating naval carrier battle groups. While these factors are both relevant and accurate, the justification most often provided for assigning priority to Air Force units is the lack of an air refueling capability in the Navy's HH60H, an argument with little true justification.⁷ Can the Navy continue expending money and energy on training for a capability that some feel is not being used?

Can DoD also afford to maintain a joint policy that directs each service to provide CSAR capabilities for its own forces? Some proponents suggest that the mission should be turned over permanently to the Air Force or SOF where it can be accomplished efficiently, reducing redundant service capabilities. This alternative may sound attractive but current limits in force structure, technology, operating doctrines, and employment policies make it a non-starter. First, without a significant increase in units or funding, no single service can meet all the current CSAR alert requirements. When SOF units are tasked with CSAR, it comes at the expense of other capabilities. Although normally they are not the primary assets, Navy forces routinely augment the capabilities of forward-deployed units in established theaters, providing them with necessary stand-down time. Without a large expansion of existing forces in other services, continued naval augmentation is required to meet the demands of current military operations.

Second, the Navy historically has been tasked to operate in areas outside the coverage of forward-deployed joint units. The mobility and access the Navy provides in such situations are essential to the

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Navy CSAR

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national military strategy. With the potential loss of forward basing, it is likely that the Navy someday will again be required to conduct operations in areas outside those supported by forward basing. Even during joint operations, the Navy may be required to operate in or from a geographic axis—which would prevent direct joint support. Since an amphibious ready group normally operates independently of the carrier battle groups, naval air assets cannot depend on Marine Corps tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel capabilities for planned requirements.

At present, no strike force plans a mission without addressing a CSAR contingency in some way. With the geopolitical ramifications that result from captured personnel, can DoD take the risk of not having a CSAR contingency available to Navy forces? The answer, obviously, is “no.” It is equally unlikely that the Navy or policy makers will want to limit the application of naval power by requiring the deployment of some joint force to the carrier before its strike power can be employed. Deployment of CSAR forces takes time, and waiting until the capability is needed before deploying contingency efforts simply does not work. The time-critical nature of CSAR operations (after the first 48 hours, the chances of successful recovery drop dramatically) has driven the Navy to use indigenous helicopter assets to attempt recoveries, irrespective of the lack of training or the threat involved. Although current plans to shift SOF and Air Force CSAR capabilities to the V-22 will increase the range and speed in which these assets could respond, any loss of indigenous CSAR capability would make naval air strike capabilities dependent on the prior deployment of external assets. Therefore, CSAR capabilities must be maintained within carrier battle groups in the foreseeable future.

The concept of moving the Navy’s CSAR capability back into the reserve has the same drawbacks presented by a dependence on external joint forces. The inherent need for quick response to a



CSAR scenario prohibits the Navy from a reliance on any external force deployment. The other extreme option would involve disbanding the HCS squadrons and transferring all of their assets to the active force. Although it would eliminate active-duty shortfalls in aircraft, this course of action also would squander the skills of many highly trained aircrews, and it disregards the political impracticalities involved. The strength of the Naval Reserve lobby played an essential role in the procurement of the current HH-60H CSAR aircraft. Active-duty forces are dependent on reserve funding to help pay for the future CH-60 CSAR mission kit. It therefore is unlikely that this course of action could or would be adopted. Yet with today’s operational limitations and requisite presidential approval for employment of reservists, it is unlikely that the reserve’s utility will increase unless they somehow alter their basic role.

Since mission and operational realities preclude any alternative to maintaining an indigenous CSAR capability in carrier battle groups, maximizing the total value of the force hinges on increasing the utility of the reserve component. Barring a complete restructuring of reserve forces and their operational limitations, the first and most important step should be the relocation of the reserve HCS squadrons to Jacksonville, Florida, and North Island, California. Although the movement of a squadron’s homeport is difficult, collocating HCS squadrons with the HS squadrons they actually support will, in the long run, facilitate increased cooperation and permit both forces to best leverage existing assets and emergent simulator technologies. In addition, current training initiatives inside naval aviation, designed to provide aircrew standardization and increased joint interoperability, are being hampered by a lack of aircraft and trained personnel in the HS community. Direct Naval Reserve support and participation in these programs would provide the essential components for success.⁸ If successfully implemented, this proposal will result in a significantly improved CSAR capability for the Navy and assist in the support of future joint requirements.⁹

¹Dennis J. Rowley, *U.S. Navy Helicopters in Combat Search and Rescue* (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, 1992), p. 10.

²Russel D. Carmody, *Theater Combat Search and Rescue* (Leavenworth, KS: Fort Leavenworth, 1993), p.25.

³Carmody, p. 29. During a 1997 Tactical Aviation Strike conference in Fallon, Nevada, one of hottest issues in seven out of ten working groups was concern over the number of CSAR recovery helicopters. After a few minutes of discussion a senior naval aviation leader stood up and ended the debate with the pronouncement, “Why are we even talking about this? We are here to discuss strike warfare. CSAR is an expensive waste of our time and assets.”

⁴Hellfire installation began in 1998.

⁵Michael T. Fuqua, “We Can Fix Combat SAR in the Navy,” September 1997 *Proceedings*, p. 58.

⁶Lieutenant Peter Gwynne, HS Wing Atlantic Weapons Tactics Instructor, telephone conversation with author.

⁷Basic ranges without air-to-air refueling are roughly comparable between Air Force and Navy rescue helicopters. The flight profile for air-to-air refueling requires a benign, very-low threat area to conduct operations. Most areas with this low-level threat could just as easily support portable ground refueling stations.

⁸Naval aviation is in the midst of establishing a program known as the Air Combat training Continuum (ACTC). This is an attempt to create standardized cradle-to-grave mission training tracks for all aircrew under the joint supervision of each community’s leadership and NSAWC.

⁹At present, proposals exist that would consolidate existing HS squadrons with active-duty HC squadrons, which provide supply support to the fleet.

At the time he wrote this article, Commander Rucci was the weapons officer on the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)

CLEAN HUNTER*(Continued from page 10)*

launched to escort a SAR helicopter in to recover the survivors and MEDEVAC them. The CSAR Task Force (CSARTF) was opposed by a naval surface-to-air threat as well as an air threat composed of MiG-29s from the German Air Force.

Because the scenario involved quasi-unconventional warfare personnel recovery methods (submarine insertion and extraction, and ground team link-up), and employed forces not dedicated to CSAR, there was no written NATO doctrine or tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) available to the CRCC staff. The CRCC staff was forced spent a lot of time engaged in brainstorming and “what-if” discussion. The event played out over 60 hours, a very long time for injured aircrew to effectively survive and evade a determined enemy. The “start from zero” plan, however, provided a steep learning curve for all involved. The integrated CPX/FTX nature of the exercise provided some classic lessons learned. For example, the air mission commander (AMC) aboard the NATO AEW aircraft mistakenly injected an erroneous survivor location into the mission, possibly because of a transcription or SARNEG conversion error. This event provided an excellent learning tool for the participants. The exercise uncovered interoperability problems, as well. For example, images German Air Force RECCE aircraft took could not be transmitted to the NATO CAOC or to the Danish Special Forces tasked to perform the recovery. This example is proof that exercises are suitable means to reveal interoperability problems.

The following lessons learned were briefed at the CSAR exercise hot-wash to the CAOC and CRCC staffs:

- CSAR training events must include command and control (C²) elements, live recovery forces and live survivors in order to produce realistic training and viable lessons learned
- CRCC was too isolated from the CAOC, resulting in a lack of integration of efforts
- CRCC needs a SAR Duty Officer (SARDO) in CAOC Combat Operations area to integrate CSAR operations into air operations
- CRCC needs a SAR Planning Officer (SARPO) in CAOC Combat Plans area to integrate CSAR planning into air operations planning
- Communication between C², recovery forces, and survivors is the biggest challenge

**COOPERATIVE KEY***(Continued from page 11)*

sion consisting of two Slovenian AB-212s and an Italian AB-212 escorted by two Romanian PUMA Gunships and four A-10s. In a fourth mission, the three Hungarian Hips were escorted by two Bulgarian MI-24 Hinds and four A-10s. These missions were excellent examples of “Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment.” The aircrews were highly professional and enthusiastic throughout the exercise.

Exercise Cooperative Key 2001 was the best coalition CSAR exercise that we have observed since we began to study Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment. The exchange of information was outstanding and U.S. military personnel did a superb job. Moreover, it was inspiring to watch the various PFP aircrews listen and follow the advice of the briefing teams. Over the exercise days, efficiency and performance improved dramatically, proving the value of live coalition exercises.

SIMSAR*(Continued from page 5)*

of a laptop-based simulation. The simulation will present an area of operations as a backdrop to discuss procedures in the context in which they would be addressed for a potential SAR incident. The SimSAR tool will facilitate exploring issues of mutual concern through the use of “what if” scenarios.

IAMSAR Foundation to Discussions

The relatively new International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual provides a good foundation for these expanded discussions on Civil SAR policies and procedures. Using the information in the IAMSAR Manual, SimSAR will present a dynamic, authoritative representation of a fictional SAR scenario; thus generating a logical sequence for the discussion of SAR processes and considerations. The scenario will follow a scripted flow of events designed to generate discussion on SAR Stages and SAR Emergency Phases. The IAMSAR Manual provides guidelines and checklists to assist in the coordination of national and international responses to a SAR incident. The central theme of SimSAR is international cooperation in accordance with IAMSAR, emphasizing the willingness and capability of the US military, and the US Coast Guard’s SAR organization to assist, where practical.

Benefit to ASD/ISA and USCG

Military-to-military discussions of international Civil SAR situations are generally led by a senior representative of DPMO and/or the US Coast Guard (USCG). While the dialogue, itself, is the key objective of the ASD/ISA, the forum provides a unique opportunity to coalesce USCG and international SAR agencies. Therefore, USCG representatives are actively involved in its development. SimSAR represents a new capability for the education and training of SAR organizations and forces, with applicability to Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs); Search and Rescue Units (SRUs); the staffs of unified commands; and SAR education and training organizations, such as the US National Search and Rescue School in Yorktown, Virginia.

Personnel Changes at DPMO

(Continued from page 1)

personnel recovery efforts, PCS'd last summer. Clair returned to flying in Albuquerque, NM, as a schoolhouse flight instructor. Brenda stayed in the local area with a job on the Air Staff as Resource and Analysis staff officer in the USAF Chief Information Office. We will miss them both. CDR Bill Doan is the sole surviving personnel recovery policy advisor, and Jo Anne Travis and Jay Basham continue to serve as our interface with the Intelligence Community.

However, capable officers with diverse backgrounds have come aboard and we welcome them. Lt Col Matthew Shozda, a USAF helicopter pilot, began his career with the Air Rescue and Recovery Service flying the H-3. After an H-53 transition, Matt spent the next 13 years in the special operations community, which included a staff tour in Korea and operational experience in DESERT STORM, the Balkans, and Haiti.

Joining us from the U.S. Army is LTC Orlando Lopez. LTC Lopez is an experienced attack helicopter pilot and DESERT STORM veteran with flight hours in the UH-1, AH-1, OH-58, and UH-60. He was twice selected for company command and later served as S3 and Executive Officer for 2d Squadron, 4th Aviation Regiment.

Our final new arrival is Major Robin Athey. A former Missile Combat Crew Commander, Robin comes to us from Air Force Space Command, where he served as a Range Commander and Controller during rocket launches and as a staff officer in the Requirements Directorate. He has a broad range of knowledge in the acquisition field and will help us monitor and advocate personnel recovery-related acquisition and technology issues.

These new arrivals give DPMO an experience base across a broad range of military disciplines and will certainly benefit the personnel recovery community at large as we forge an integrated personnel recovery architecture.

Hon. Jerry D. Jennings

(Continued from page 5)

establishing and maintaining all programs and policies relating to security and domestic intelligence concerns of the National Security Council. He was the White House liaison with the FBI on criminal and intelligence matters requiring the attention of the President or his senior staff.

He performed his military duty with the U.S. Marine Corps, and served as an intelligence officer with the CIA in Southeast Asia from 1965 to 1968. He was assigned to key posts in the Department of Justice 1968-72, including service as a Special Agent with the FBI.

A native of Grand Blanc, Michigan, Mr. Jennings obtained his BS degree from Eastern Michigan University. He studied for a Master's degree in public administration at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York. He also completed the Senior Managers Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

2002 DoD Personnel Recovery Conference

(Continued from page 4)

inviting key members of the DoD leadership, DPMO and USJFCOM will invite intelligence community leaders, senior officials from the interagency community, and industry representatives. Additionally, we are inviting international military leaders and personnel recovery experts. Unlike previous conferences, we will focus on both policy-level and operational-level issues.

All participating units and organizations will need to fund conference registration, travel, and per diem costs of its participants. Pre-registration will occur entirely on-line through the NDIA (<http://www.ndia.org>). We encourage you to visit the NDIA web site and provide them your name and address. NDIA will, in turn, provide you conference information and registration details. The conference fee will cover administrative costs of the conference. It is fully reimbursable. DPMO and USJFCOM have arranged for a substantially lower registration fee for the first 250 U.S. Government uniformed/civilian employees and 50 international military participants to register @ \$150.00/person. Conference fees are as follows:

- Other Government participants: \$400.00
- Other International military representatives: \$405.00
- Industry (NDIA member): \$570.00
- Industry (non-NDIA member): \$620.00
- There will be a late registration 10% surcharge for any payments received after June 15, 2002.

Conference participants are responsible for arranging their own billing. Out-of-town participants attending the conference under the \$150.00 DPMO registration fee must stay at the Hyatt to receive the reduced registration fee.

Their room rate during the conference will be at the Government per diem rate. The Hyatt has guaranteed 150 rooms at the Government per diem rate for Monday, 05 August through Tuesday night, 06 August and 120 rooms for Wednesday night, 07 August. We are obligated to fill these rooms to receive the conference facilities

without additional charges. We strongly encourage all out-of-town participants to stay at the Hyatt Regency Crystal City.

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Calendar of Events

Jan 7-11, 02	Code of Conduct Training Conference	JPRA
Jan 8, 02	Personnel Recovery Technology Integrated Product Team (PRTIPT)	DUSD (AS&C)
Jan 02 (TBD)	Personnel Recovery Technology Working Group (PRTWG)	DUSD (AS&C)
Feb 12, 02	Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG) Meeting	DPMO
Feb 02 (TBD)	PRTIPT	DUSD (AS&C)
May 6-10, 02	SERE Psychologist Conference, San Diego	JPRA
May 02	SERE Directors' Conference, New Brunswick	JPRA
Jun 11, 02	PRAG Meeting	DPMO
Aug 6-8, 02	DoD Personnel Recovery Conference	DPMO/USJFCOM
Sep 02	PRAG Meeting	DPMO



HELP!!

We plan to publish this newsletter on a more regular basis than we have in the past, but we need your help with articles. We see this publication as a personnel recovery community newsletter, not just a DPMO publication. Our commitment is to publish it March, June, September, and December of each year. Please submit articles to us NLT the end of February, May and August so that we can include them in that next issue. We are interested in anything you would like to share with the community at large; combat and exercise/training lessons learned, new procedures, announcement for conferences, etc. Please help us make this an even better product.

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